New longitudinal data on individuals linked across nineteenth century U.S. censuses document t he geo gra phic and occupational mobility of more than 75,000 Americans from the 1850s to the 1920s. Together with longitudinal data for more recent years, these data make po ssible for the first time systematic comparisons of mobility over the last 150 years of American economic development, as well as cross-national comparisons for the nineteenth century. The U.S. was a substantially more mobile economy than Britain between 1850 and 1880. But both intergenerational occupational mobility and geographic mobility have declined in the U.S. since the beginning of the twentieth centu ry, leaving much less apparent two aspect s of the "American Exceptionalism" noted by nineteenth century observers.
later, in a nation of growing factories and thundering steam engines and immigrant ghettos, Karl Marx (1865 Marx ( [2001 , p. 67) foresaw that such rapid mobility would preclude the formation of strong class consciousness, in an economy which experienced "a continuous conversion of wage laborers into independent self-sustaining peasants . . . [where t]he position of wages laborer is for a very large part of the American peo ple but a probational state, which t hey are sure to leave within a longer or a shorter term." At the start of the twentieth century, observers like Werner Sombart (190 6 [1 976 ]) continued to ascribe the conser vat ism of American wo rke rs t o t heir unique opportunities for economic and social mobility. America's high levels of mobility seemed an exception to the patterns of development seen elsewhere.
Recent research comparing mobility in the modern U.S. to other countries, however, reveals that U.S. mobility is not exceptional today. Since the 1970s, systematic comparisons of intergenerational occupational mobility have revealed that by the second half of the twentieth century, the U.S. was no more mobile than similarly developed countries. Erikson (1992, pp. 336-337) wrote: "In none of these respects, however, could our findings for the United States . . . be regarded as 'exceptional' when set against those from Eu ropean nations . . . . [I] t could no t be said that [the U.S. differs] more widely from European nations in . . . actual rates and patterns of mobility than do European nations among themselves." Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) find that interge nerational income mobility in t he United St ates is no grea ter than in S weden, while income inequ ality is conside rable higher in the Unit ed S tates. S olo n (2002 , p. 64) conclud ed in t his journal: "At this stage, it seems reasonable to conclude that the United States and the United Kingdom appear t o be less mobile societies than ar e Canada, Finland and Sweden" in the link between the incomes earned by fathers and sons.
2 Even if the answers to both (1) and (2) are "yes," convergence between the U.S. and European mobility levels could have occurred through falling U.S. mobility, rising European mobility, or a combination of both. We presently lack the data to assess the role of changing European mobility, however. The failure of perceptions to catch up with the underlying reality can be rationalized by a model of social learning and self-reinforcing expectations (Piketty, 1995) .
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Despite the general similarity of mobility across advanced countries at the end of the twentieth century, though, the image of the U.S. as a land of limitless opportunity and a place where high mobility remains the norm persists down to the present day and undermines support for a fiscal regime of higher taxes and higher transfers like that seen in Europe (Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch, 2001 ). This paradox raises two question:. (1) Was mobility in the U.S. ever as great as the popular image would have us believe? and (2) Was mobility in the nineteenth century U.S . -a s co mmentators fro m de T ocque ville to Ma rx t o Sombart conte nded -substant ially great er than European mobility? If the answers t o bot h quest ions are "yes," the vastly different public perceptions of mobility pro spect s and co rresp onding po licy differences to day might then be more a legacy of historical experience than a reflection of current circumstances.
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This article addresses these questions by examining new evidence of "American Exceptionalism" -in occupational and geographic mobility across generations -for the midnineteent h and early twentiet h centuries and assessing ho w mobility has changed over the intervening century and a half. It uses newly available evidence on 75,000 U.S. males linked across U.S. censuses between 1850 and 1920. Explicit co mparisons to mo bility in more recent longitudinal surveys -such as t he Occupational Changes in a Generat ion Study (1973 ), the General Social Survey (1977 , and the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (1979-99) -make it possible to identify when, if not why, the modern levels of U.S. intergenerational first appeared. Comparison of mobility in the United States and Britain from 1850 to 1880 is also now 3 Previous wor k on nineteent h century occupa tiona l mobilit y in the Unit ed Sta tes r elied on sa mples of individuals culled from census manus cripts , tax lists, or voting records for a par ticular community who were then sought in subsequent enumerations in the same location at a la ter date. The shortcomings of these sources are explor ed in Ferrie (200 4), which als o provides a deta iled description of the construct ion of the nineteenth and early twentieth century linked samples used here. These samples are nationally repr esenta tive and include both migr ants and non-migrants. The analys es tha t follow are limited to white, native-born males to assure comparability throughout the 1850-2000 period (it is not possible to identify individuals with for eign-born par ents in the late twentieth century dat a, so they were included for the historical data ; the occupations of foreign-born fathers in the historical and twentieth century data are their occupations while they were in the U.S.). 4 possible, revea ling if U. S. mobilit y in this era was in fact exce ptional.
Data for the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
The computerization of the 1880 U.S. federal census, the completion of public use samples from the federal censuses of 1850-1870 and 1900-1910 , and the creation of indexes containing the name of each individual in the 1860, 1870, and 1920 federal censuses have made possible the creation of large, nationally representative, longitudinal data sets for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These sources provide information on the location (state, count y, township, cit y, ward, str eet address) of individuals at two po ints in time separat ed by ten, twenty, or thirty years, and their occupations at those two dates.
3 For younger individuals, these sou rce s make it possible to compar e the o ccupat ions of pare nts to the occup ations of t heir children two or three decades later (intergenerational occupational mobility), as well as to measure geographic mobility. Eight cohorts have been completed: two that span thirty years (1850-80 and 1880-1910) , three that span twenty years (1860-80, 1880-1900, and 1900-20) , and three that span ten years (1850-60, 1860-70, and 1870-80) . They range in size from 2,000 (1860-70 and 1900-20) to 38,000 (1880-1910) . Similar data for 25,000 males in Britain followed over the period 1851-81 make possible systematic comparisons of mobility across these two economies in the second half of the nineteenth century (Long and Ferrie, 2005 (Featherman and Hauser, 1978) . By selecting individuals who were 33 to 39 years of age at the time of the survey, it is possible to construct data roughly similar to that for the nineteenth century: for individuals in the OCG, 17 to 23 years will have passed between the date of their father's o ccupation and the date of their own. cat ego ry (fa rmer ) to anot her (white collar) . Assoc iation could cha nge because of a weakening in the impediments to mobility (educational requirements, t he strength o f crafts or guilds, the importance of social networks) that improves the chance for some groups moving into an occupation (sons of farmers moving into white collar jobs) by more than it improved the chances of others moving into the same occupation (sons of white collar workers moving into white collar jobs themselves). Changes in prevalence can be measured by how marginal frequencies change (e.g. how the ratio of farmers to white collar workers for fathers and sons compares in two eras); changes in association can be measured by how odds ratios change (e.g. how the odds white collar so ns would get white collar rather than farm jobs relative to the odds that farmers' sons would get white collar rather than farm jobs compares in two eras).
6
For examp le, in the to p two pane ls of T able 1 , so ns of farme rs w ere near ly twic e as likely to get white collar jobs in the twentieth century as in the nineteenth (31.9/16.6). This absolute mobility change can be the result of a rise in the ratio of white collar job growth to farm job growth fro m the nineteenth century to t he twentieth ( prevalence) or a decline in the relative disadvantages previously faced by the sons of farmers in getting white collar jobs (association), or a combination of these forces. Relative mobility focuses solely on the change in the chances of sons of farmers getting white collar jobs compared to the chances of the sons of other fathers getting white collar jobs and is a function of association alone. In the 1880-1900 table, the odds ratio for the four upper left cells is 16.8; in 1950/56-1973 , it is 75.5. This means that the ratio of the odds a white collar son would get a white collar rather than a farm job compared to the odds that a farm son would get a white collar jo b rather than a farm job grew nearly five-fold from the 7 Mosteller (1968) shows how contingency tables can be manipulated to have any desired marginal frequencies without altering the under lying odds ratios which are the fundamental measure of a ssociat ion. This makes it possible to see how mobility would have changed if prevalence but not association had changed (by adjus ting one era's table to have the sa me marginal frequencies a s another's, as in comparing Panels A and C), or how mobility would have changed if association but not prevalence had changed (by taking tables from two era s and adjus ting them to have the same margina l frequencies, a s in comparing Panels B and C or A and D). Occupa tional distr ibutions a re held constant at the occup ational distribution for fathers at the start of the period for the columns and for sons at the end of the period in the rows. 8 nineteenth to the twentieth century.
To isolate the impact of prevalence and association, the two bottom panels of Table 1 show t he relationship between fathers' and sons' o ccupations in these two er as when t he distributions of fathers' and sons' occupations are held at the values from the other era. Relative mobility can also be summarized for an entire table and compared across tables. Altham (1970) proposed a measure of the difference in relative mobility between two contingency tables like those in Panel A and B that is based solely on the odds ratios. For two tables P and Q, the Altham statistic d(P,Q) measures the difference bet ween (1) the association bet ween ro ws and columns in Table P and (2) the association between rows and columns in Table Q . 8 Replacing o ne the null hypothesis that there is no difference between P and Q in the as sociation between rows and columns which is equivalent to testing H 0 : Table Q ). The Altham statistic is a pure function of the odds ratios in each table, so it is not affected by differences in the marginal frequencies.
In Table 1 , if we use P anel A for Relative mobility was also substantially higher in the U.S. than in Britain over the three the association between fathers' and sons' occupations was a great deal closer to independence (i.e. exhibited greater mobility) in the U.S. than in Britain, and we can reject at any conventional significance level the null hypothesis that the associations are equal. As contemporary observers asserted, the United States had a more fluid occupational structure than Britain. These differences reflected something more fundamental than differences in the distributions of occupations between the two economies. The United St ates was "exceptional" in the mobility it displayed in the ninet eenth c ent ury compar ed t o at least one advanced E uropean eco nomy.
Brit ish and U. S. mobilit y in the twent ieth century can also be co mpar ed u sing t he t oo ls It is not possible at present to calculate the change in mobility within Britain from the nineteenth century to t he twentieth, as t he historical data used by Long and Ferr ie (2005) s pan thirty years a nd the data from the Oxford Mobility Study span only twenty (to avoid the influence of the Great Depression). Work in progress will result in a British sample with fathers observed in 1881 and sons in 1901 that can be compared directly to both the 1800-1900 U.S. data and the Oxford Mobility Study. 14 mobility across gener ations was no more likely in the U.S. than in Brit ain.
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Accounting for High U.S. Occupational Mobility Through 1920
The U.S. had more relative occupational mobility across generations through the 1900-1920 cohor t than either Britain in the second half of the nineteent h century or t he U.S. in the second half of the twentieth century. Any attempt to account for these differences must immediately confront the size of the farm sector in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century U.S. By 1851, much of the movement out of farming that would ever occur in Britain had already taken place (the farm sector accounted for less than 5 percent of male employment by 1851). By 1950, farming employed only 12 percent of the adult male labor force in the U.S. In contrast, thro ughout the 1850-1920 perio d, the U.S. farm sector remained large (nearly two thirds o f the adult male labo r force in 1850 and more than a t hird through 1900) and continued t o bot h add and lose new workers (with net significant losses) (Long and Ferrie, 2005) .
Though the Altham statistics used here to measure relative mobility account for differences bo th within and acro ss mobility tables in marginal frequencies, there remains the possibility that the size of t he farm sect or in the 1850-1920 U.S. nonetheless mat tered for relative mobility. If migration into and out of farming is increasingly selective as the farm sector shrinks, then those exiting and entering farming in the 1850-1920 U.S. were a less selected population 10 The reduction in the difference between mobility in the historical U.S. and mobility in the modern U.S. when this adjustment is made does not prove that mobility was reduced because of a subtle change in the selectivity of movement out of and into a gricultu re as the fa rm sector shrank. It is possible, for example, that a more important development was a simple change in the costs and benefits of making these moves. Perhaps remaining in farming was an increasingly attractive option for the remaining farm sons as subsidy programs instituted in the 1930s stabilized farm incomes, and that the capitalized value of those benefits made purchasing one's way into farming a less attractive alternative for those whose fathers were not farmers. Changes in the selectivity of movement from the farm sector on the basis of unobservable characteristics are examined explicitly in Ferrie (2005a) . In either case, it would be unwise to ignore entirely movement out of and into far ming in assessing how mobility evolved, because the far m sector remained so large a fraction of the labor force throu gh the first deca des of the twentieth centur y. 15 than corresponding individuals in late nineteenth century Britain or in the late twentieth century U.S . If this selectivity t akes the form of a re duc ed willingness t o exit o r enter the far m secto r as it shrinks, we would expect greater persistence in farming among those whose fathers were farmers and less ent ry into far ming by those whose fat hers were not farmers in Britain after 1851 o r in the U.S. after 1950 t han in the U. S. fro m 1850 t o 1920. Long and Fer rie (2005) re-calculated t he Altham statistics after eliminating those who either remained in farming or entered it and find that this act ually widens the gap in mobility between the U.S. and Br itain in the ninet eenth centur y and leave s a much smaller bu t st ill sta tist ically sig nificant gap be tween t he lat e nineteent h and ear ly twentieth century and the late twentieth century U.S.
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Other expla nat ions for the dist inctively high mobilit y in the late nineteent h and ear ly twent ieth cent ury U.S. can be identified. Economists model intergenerat ional mobility as the outcome of a process of investment by parents (perhaps with the assistance of capital markets) and the state (through its provision of public education) (Grawe and Mulligan, 2004) . Where capital markets function less well or public education is less widely provided, intergenerational mobility will be lower.
Whether capital markets were better at facilitating intergenerational investment s in the 11 Educational access might have still mattered if either: (1) the educational background necessary to ac hieve occu pat ional mob ility ou t of one's father' s occu pat ion was increa sing mor e rap idly tha n the level of education being publicly provided; or (2) the distr ibution of educa tional access was becoming increa singly u nequal over time in the U.S . even as the level of edu cation provided was rising. T he latt er might account for some of the differences between the modern U.S. and countries with more egalitarian education systems (Canada, Finland).
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U.S. than in Britain is unknown, so we cannot say whether differential access by parents to capital produced differential mobility in the nineteenth century . There should be little doubt, however, tha t U.S. ca pital market s by the 19 50s wer e bet ter eq uipp ed t o he lp parents invest in their children's futures than they had been a century earlier. Yet mobility in the U.S. was greater from 185 0 to 1920 tha n it w as fr om 1950 /56 to 197 3. R elat ively less access to public educatio n in Britain t han in the U. S. co uld acco unt for some o f the difference in mobility between them in the ninet eent h century -e duc ation was less rigorous bu t mo re e galit aria n in the U. S. tha n in Britain in the nineteenth century (Long and Ferrie, 2005, pp. 31-32) . But like changes in capital market access, changes in acc ess t o educ ation g o in t he wr ong dire ction t o explain the observed d ecline in intergenerational mobility within the U.S.
11
A particular form of investment (by either parents or the individuals themselves) may have still been a source of higher mobility in the late nineteenth and early tw entieth century U.S. Both Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) suggest viewing migration as an investment. Internal migration was considerably more frequent in the U.S. at the end of the nineteenth century than it was in Britain at the same time or in the U .S. a century later.
When de Tocqueville surveyed the American economy of the 1830s, he was also 12 In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville (183 5-40 [1862] , Book 1, p. 374) obser ved,"millions of men are marching at once toward the same horizon; their language, their religion, their manners differ; their object is the same. For tune has been pr omised to them somewhere in the west, and to the west they go to find it." Mobility was high even in places that had only recently been settled: "I ha ve spoken of the emigration from the older states but how shall I describe that which takes place from the more recent ones? Fifty years have scarcely elapsed since Ohio was founded; the greater part of its inhabitants were not born within its confines; its capital has been built only thirty years, and its territory is still covered by an immense extent of uncultivated fields; yet already the population of Ohio is proceeding westward, and most of the settlers who descend to the fertile prairies of Illinois are citizens of Ohio. These men left their first count ry to improve t heir condition; they quit their second t o amelior ate it still more; fortu ne awaits t hem everywhere, but not happiness" (1835-40 [1862] , Book 1, pp. 376-377). 13 The result s ar e similar if ot her data s ets that s pan t en, 20 , or 3 0 year s ar e used, like the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort. No adjustment has been made in these comparisons for the increase in the number of sta tes and counties since the middle of the nineteenth century. T he NLS does not identify the respondent's location with sufficient precision to make such adjustments possible. If new states or counties have been created by subdividing those that existed in the nineteenth century, the gap between nineteenth and twentieth century mobility is actually understated: if modern county boundaries were imposed on historical counties, some intra-county moves would be 17 struck by the young nation's extremely high rates of geographic mobility.
12 This geographic mobility, too, became a facet of "American exceptionalism." The U.S. was characterized by greater residential mobility than Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. Inter-county moves were made by nearly two-thirds of U.S. men over 30 years, but were made by only a quarter of British men (counties being roughly the same size on average in both count ries). Mos t mo ves in Brit ain we re shor t dista nce ( median=5 mile s, mean=2 4 miles) , while in the United St ates, distances were longer (median=36 miles, mean=213 miles) wit h more t han a third over 100 miles compared to only 6 percent in Britain. Was there also a decline in physical mobility in the U.S . over time that parallels the decline in occupational mobility across gener ations in Figure 1 ? Table 2 shows rates of inter-county and interstate migration for young men and older men over a decade for three nineteenth century samples and the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) cohor ts of Y oung Men and Older Men in the t wentieth c ent ury.
reclass ified as inter-county moves. If some states or counties were not even par t of the settled U.S . in the nineteenth century, the addi tion of new destinations sinc e the nineteenth century ha s expa nded the choice set faced by potential migrants and prob ably increa sed measured interstate and inter-count y migration; taking account of this would also widen the gap between nineteenth and twentieth century migration rates. Only the consolidation of geogra phic units t hat existed in the nineteenth century (which occur red rar ely) or the addition of new places ou t of which people were disprop ortionat ely unlikely to migrate would bias the comparison in the opposite direction and narrow the gap between historical and modern migration rates.
Civil War, inter-county and interstate migration rates were extraordinarily high before 1900. By the twent ieth century, t here is a dro p in int er-count y migratio n and an even sharp er d rop in interst ate migr ation. The high r ates o f mobilit y in the 185 0s and 1870 s are re mark able a t a time when the cost of migration (both the direct transportation cost and t he cost of acquiring informatio n abo ut altern ative lo cat ions ) must have been co nsidera bly higher tha n to day.
Are declining rates o f geogr aphic mobility relat ed to the changes do cumented above in the association between the occupations of fathers and sons? Kim (1998) finds that regional specialization inc rea sed thr ough 1880 , fell slight ly thr ough 1910 , and then fell dra matically thr ougho ut the res t o f the twentieth c ent ury. 14 This suggests t hat through the first decades o f the twent ieth century, e ven as the fro ntier wa s clo sing a nd mo vement int o farming was less fr equ ent ly a rou te to eco nomic advancement, substantial differences across locations in the predominant econo mic activities left another ro ute t o advancement: migration to p laces that wer e gro wing more rapidly than others. Opportunities for "locational arbitrage" may have allowed many of those whose prospects were poor at their original location to seek out promising destinations. By the early decades of the twent ieth cent ury, fewer such arbitrage opportunities remained, and migration distances fell as movement was redirected away from distant, rapidly-growing places to adjacent cities and towns which could often be reached by crossing a county boundary but 15 For non-migrants (P) a nd migra nts (Q), t he Altha m statist ics for each cohort a re: It would be unwise to des crib e geogra phic mobility a s the cause of higher mobility, however , as if it wer e a randomly-assigned treatment applied to an entir e population. The migrat ion decision was no doubt made with an eye toward the individua l's fu tur e pros pects , so the popu lation of migrants may have been select ed for those who expected to derive the greatest benefit from changing locations. The evidence offered here is intended to be no more than suggestive. The selectivity of migra tion from rur al to urban places and to the western frontier is examined in Ferrie (2005a and 2005b) .
without crossing a state boundary, accounting for the sharper decline in interstate migration than in inter-count y migration.
Were those who moved physically also more mobile occupationally? For the late nineteenth and early twentieth century cohorts, it is possible to calculate separate Altham statistics to measure relative occupational mobility for two groups: (1) those who changed their county of residence over twent y years and (2) those who remained in the same co unty. In each case, the
Altham statistic was at least t wice as gr eat ( mobility was lower) for those who r emained in the same county. For all three cohorts -1860-80, 1880-1900, and 1900-20 -it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the relationship between fathers' and sons' occupations was identical for movers and non-movers.
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As the importance of geographic mobility as an avenue to econo mic advancement diminished, the importance of education has risen over the twentieth century. Goldin (1994) documents the changes in American high school education t aking place between 1910 and the ear ly 1930s: an increa sed empha sis o n pract ical, job-rele vant skills a nd vo cat ional training, as well as much higher high school graduation rates. Research on recent trends in mobility has empha sized the role o f family inves tment in edu cat ion in fo ste ring interge nerational mobilit y (in incomes) as the retur ns to education have risen (Mayer and Lo ppo, 2001) . Though families in the early twentieth century no doubt increased investment in their children's human capital as geographic mobility became less viable as a route to occupational mobility, the benefits that education provides are quite different from the benefits of geographic mobility. For a young adult, education is much less a choice variable than is location. Education choices may be more often subject to a binding budget const raint t han choice of locat ion. And educat ion depends on t he wisdom of the previous generation in choosing the proper investment level. A change from geographic mobility to educational investment as the avenue t o inter generational mobility in the twent ieth centu ry may have left families wit h few er o pt ions tha n in t he nineteenth c ent ury.
Conclusion
Nineteenth-century observers were right: the United States was in fact more mobile both socially and physically than o ther places, and this remarkable fluidity persisted at least t hrough the 1920s. However, that distinctiveness had diminished by the 1950s. It remains to be seen why mobilit y diminishe d whe n it d id. T hou gh Ma rx pred icted t hat the clos ing o f the frontier wo uld reduce American mobility to European levels, inter-generational mobility remained common thro ugh the first two decades o f the twentiet h century, decades aft er the 1890 closing of the frontier. Pr omising avenues of future research in explaining the mobility transition are t he changing ro les of geo graphic mo bility and education, the rise of inter nal labor markets in the 1920s that placed a premium on remaining with the same firm and foreclosed some inter-firm mobility as a route to upward occupational movement, and the birth of the American welfare state , 1880-1900 and 1950/1956-1973 (White, NativeBorn Males Age 33-39 in Terminal Year). 
